Monday, April 16, 2012

Fed Policy and Inflation Risk by Martin Feldstein


Navigated from Greg Mankiw's Blog | shared via feedly mobile


  CAMBRIDGE – During the past four years, the United States Federal Reserve has added enormous liquidity to the US commercial banking system, and thus to the American economy. Many observers worry that this liquidity will lead in the future to a rapid increase in the volume of bank credit, causing a brisk rise in the money supply – and of the subsequent rate of inflation.

That risk is real, but it is not inevitable, because the relationship between the reserves held at the Fed and the subsequent stock of money and credit is no longer what it used to be. The explosion of reserves has not fueled inflation yet, and the large volume of reserves could in principle be reversed later. But reversing that liquidity may be politically difficult, as well as technically challenging.

Anyone concerned about inflation has to focus on the volume of reserves being created by the Fed. Traditionally, the volume of bank deposits that constitute the broad money supply has increased in proportion to the amount of reserves that the commercial banks had available. Increases in the stock of money have generally led, over multiyear periods, to increases in the price level. Therefore, faster growth of reserves led to faster growth of the money supply – and on to a higher rate of inflation. The Fed in effect controlled – or sometimes failed to control – inflation by limiting the rate of growth of reserves.

The Fed began an aggressive policy of quantitative easing in the summer of 2008 at the height of the economic and financial crisis. The total volume of reserves had remained virtually unchanged during the previous decade, varying between $40 billion and $50 billion. It then doubled between August and September of 2008, and exploded to more than $800 billion a year later. By June of 2011, the volume of reserves stood at $1.6 trillion, and has since remained at that level.

But this rise in reserves did not translate into rapid growth of deposits at commercial banks, because the Fed began in October 2008 to pay interest on those reserves. Commercial banks could place their excess funds in riskless deposits at the Fed, rather than lending them to private borrowers. As a result, the money supply has grown by only 25% since 2008, despite the 40-fold increase in reserves since that time.

During the past year, the Fed has further increased the liquidity of the banking system – and of the American economy – by a strategy called Operation Twist, buying $400 billion of long-term securities in exchange for short-term Treasury bills. The banks that hold these Treasury bills can sell them at any time, using the proceeds to fund commercial lending.

The massive substitution of reserves for longer-term securities during the period of "quantitative easing," and of Treasury bills for long-term securities in Operation Twist, has succeeded in reducing long-term interest rates. The combination of low interest rates at every maturity and the substitution of short-term securities for longer-term assets has also succeeded in raising share prices.  

But it is not clear that the lower interest rates and higher share prices have had any significant effect on real economic activity. Corporations have a great deal of liquidity, and do not depend on borrowing to invest more in plant and equipment. Housing construction has not revived, because house prices are falling. Consumers temporarily increased their spending in response to the increase in the stock market at the end of 2010, but that spending has recently been much more sluggish.

The risk is that the commercial banks could always decide to start using those excess reserves, forgoing the low rate of interest paid on deposits by the Fed (only 0.25%) and lending those funds to firms and households. Those loans would add to deposits and cause the money supply to grow. They would also increase spending by the borrowers, adding directly to inflationary pressures.

When the economy begins to recover and companies have the ability to raise prices, the commercial banks will want to increase their lending. This will be welcome, as long as it is not too much or too fast. The Fed will appropriately want to limit the expansion of bank lending. This is what the Fed used to talk about as its "exit strategy." Essentially, it would mean raising interest rates on the deposits at the Fed and allowing interest rates more generally to rise. If this is done in a timely way and on an adequate scale, the Fed will succeed in preventing the current vast liquidity from generating higher inflation.

Here is what worries me: the structure of US unemployment is very different in the current downturn than it was in the past. Nearly half of the unemployed have been out of work for six months or longer. In the past, the corresponding unemployment duration was only 10 weeks. So there is a danger that the long-term unemployed will be re-employed much more slowly than in previous recoveries.

If the unemployment rate is still very high when product markets begin to tighten, the US Congress will want the Fed to allow more rapid growth in order to bring it down, despite the resulting risk to inflation. The Fed is technically accountable to Congress, which could apply pressure on the Fed by threatening to reduce its independence.

So inflation is a risk, even if it is not inevitable. The large volume of reserves, together with the liquidity created by quantitative easing and Operation Twist, makes that risk greater. It will take skill – as well as political courage – for the Fed to avoid the rise in inflation that the existing liquidity has created.

Saturday, January 28, 2012

Daron Acemoglu on Inequality [via TheBrowser]

Daron Acemoglu on Inequality
http://thebrowser.com/interviews/daron-acemoglu-on-inequality

The US, the UK and many other countries have become far less equal over the past 30 years. The MIT economics professor says it's important we understand how and why this happened, and what it means for our societies

Hoping you enjoy this FiveBooks interview from http://thebrowser.com
For more like it, explore the archive at http://thebrowser.com/fivebooks/archive

Thursday, December 01, 2011

Monetary policy: Understanding NGDP targeting | The Economist

Understanding NGDP targeting

NOMINAL GDP targeting is not a new idea. It has an intellectual pedigree that goes back well before the crisis, but even if we just focus on the recent debate over changing Fed policy to targeting growth in the level of nominal output, we're talking about nearly 3 years' worth of public discussion. Scott Sumner started his blog in early 2009, was linked by Tyler Cowen just a few weeks later, and had the economics blogsphere debating intensely by the end of that year. It has taken a while for non-economist elites to notice, but the debate has been bubbling for a while. Neither has the American debate proceeded in isolation. Central banks pay varying amounts of attention to the path of nominal output, and some—among them the Bank of England—put quite a lot of weight on NGDP. But Kevin Drum writes that it's important to get the NGDP debate out in the open. I suppose that's right; I just figured that's what we'd all been doing for the past 30 months.

The trigger for Mr Drum's post was a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed which purported to call into question claims made on an NGDP target's behalf. What it mainly demonstrated was that quite a lot of journalists haven't paid attention to the debate over NGDP targeting. I supose that's to be expected. Those who have simply must do a better job explaining the contours of that debate to others. 

Now is as good a time as any for me to do a little of that explaining. Mr Drum writes:

Matt [Yglesias] is right that one of the theoretical virtues of NGDP targeting is that it combines both employment and inflation into a single metric, which would make this question moot for policymakers, but it unquestionably does imply that during recessions the Fed would tolerate higher inflation. I think that's a good thing (as does Matt); [WSJ writer Evans doesn't]. But it's certainly a key issue that deserves plenty of public discussion.

Let's slow down here. Does an NGDP target imply greater inflation in recessions? Were the Fed to adopt an NGDP level target right now, most supporters of the policy would recommend that the Fed allow for a period of "catch-up", during which the economy would expand at an above-trend rate in order to make up some of the ground lost during the recession. This isn't a feature unique to NGDP targeting; advocates of price-level targeting would call for something similar. During a period of catch-up, inflation would probably run above the desired rate, as would real output growth. This actually isn't even inconsistent with an inflation-rate target. A central bank actually targeting an inflation rate should react to deviations above and below target similarly, suggesting that the Fed should be no more aggressive in fighting above-normal inflation than it was in fighting below-normal inflation; 2% on average is good enough. A period of catch-up NGDP growth and inflation is really only inconsistent with a policy of steady opportunistic disinflation or, to the extent that the two are different, of central bank incompetence. One way of understanding the push for an NGDP target, I think, is as a means to get the central bank to take its mandate more seriously.

Of course, it's worth asking why there is so much ground to be made up in the first place. One of the strongest points in favour of NGDP targeting, in my view, is that it implied a need for far more action from the Fed far earlier in this business cycle. People remember how aggressively the Fed intervened to prop up the financial system in the fall of 2008, but they forget how slow the central bank was to react to what was obviously a precipitous decline in the macroeconomy. The fed funds rate stayed at 2% from April until October of 2008. The Fed didn't ramp up its initial asset purchase programme above $1 trillion until March of 2009, at which point the economy had already lost some 6m jobs. Why the delay? One data point worth noting: the monthly core inflation rate was positive throughout 2008 and 2009. NGDP growth, by contrast, was already negative in the third quarter of 2008, and was sharply negative in the fourth quarter of that year, when total spending in the economy shrank at an 8.4% annual pace. A central bank with an explicit NGDP level target would have faced (appropriately) intense pressure to do much more much sooner than one with the Fed's present, vague focus on an inflation target as a means to broader macroeconomic stability.

Now, in a situation in which a central bank has credibly established an NGDP target, recessions would by definition be due to real shocks. In those cases, maintaining the target would mean higher inflation to go with lower real growth. So if the American economy is hit by a real shock, an NGDP target might mean inflation at 5% and zero real growth, rather than what we might observe today—inflation around 3% and a drop in real growth of perhaps 2%. I'm happy to have a debate about which Americans are likely to prefer, provided that we stipulate that in the meantime, the NGDP target is also preventing major episodes of cyclical unemployment. It's worth mentioning that given a positive productivity shock, an NGDP target would imply real growth above normal levels and inflation below normal levels. An inflation-targeting central bank, by contrast, might respond by adding more stimulus to an economy, potentially inflating bubbles.

Mr Drum continues:

Evans's other two points are worth thinking about too. It's true that the Fed has to pick a target no matter what it's doing, but NGDP is a new one with no track record. That makes it trickier to get a consensus about what the right figure should be, and consensus is important since the whole point of NGDP targeting is that everyone has to believe the Fed is really, truly committed to its target.

NGDP is not a new one with no track record. Countries have been keeping track of nominal output for ages, and most central banks, including the Fed keep a close eye on the path of NGDP either explicitly or implicitly, by putting weight on both inflation and real output in making policy decisions. This isn't some crazy new variable that's been dreamt up. Consensus and commitment to an NGDP target are no more or less important than they are for an inflation or price-level target.

And the question of whether the Fed can hit an arbitrary NGDP target is critical. Central banks have pretty time-tested mechanisms for hitting inflation targets, but growth targets are something different. There are plenty of economists who are skeptical that monetary policy alone can accomplish this.

Luckily for us all, the mechanisms available to hit an NGDP target are exactly the same ones used to hit an inflation target. The Fed will communicate its policy goals, then use the levers at its disposal to move NGDP to the desired level. When the fed funds rate isn't stuck near zero, that means the standard change in the fed funds target rate and corresponding open-market operations. If NGDP is expected to be too high, rates go up; too low, and rates go down. At the zero bound, the tools are the same ones the Fed has been using or saying it could use for the past three years. If you think the Fed can affect inflation, you think the Fed can affect NGDP; that's all there is to it. Now, you might argue that the Fed can't affect inflation, but that's an extremely difficult position to reconcile against recent data.

Mr Drum closes:

Finding some kind of mechanical monetary rule that automatically produces stable growth is sort of the Holy Grail of monetary economics, and we should subject any new proposed rule to plenty of tough questioning.

Perhaps there are people making extraordinary claims for NGDP targeting. In general, I think that most of its supporters consider it to be part of the evolution of monetary economics toward a greater understanding of how the central bank can best achieve macroeconomic stability. I don't consider NGDP targeting to be a panacea or a holy grail. I simply think it's likely to perform better as a policy goal than inflation over the long run, and much better in the rare but very costly economic disaster. And I tend to believe that the idea has grown in popularity not because of unreasonable claims made on its behalf, but because of the strength of the arguments in favour of it.




Wednesday, November 02, 2011

NYTimes.com: Four Nations, Four Lessons

BUSINESS DAY   | October 23, 2011
Economic View:  Four Nations, Four Lessons
By N. GREGORY MANKIW
Recent financial mistakes in France, Greece, Japan and Zimbabwe could presage a sad future for the United States economy - if we're not careful.

Friday, September 23, 2011

The Case for more quantitative easing


No Extra Credit

What if everything that is happening in Washington right now is just meaningless noise?
What if the Obama jobs plan, the coming deliberations of the supercommittee, the debate over taxing millionaires — what if none of it is likely to make a whit of positive difference for the economy? What if the only thing that matters is something Congress and the president rarely mention, and can do nothing about?
I’ve come to believe this is the case. What is killing the economy is lack of credit. In the aftermath of an asset bubble, invariably the result of too-loose credit, banks don’t just tighten their standards; they practically shut down.
This was true during the Great Depression, and it’s been true during the Great Recession. And until normal credit standards return, economic growth will continue to be stunted. “Overreaction to the credit bubble is now the knee on the throat of the economy,” says my friend Lou Barnes, a mortgage banker at Premier Mortgage Group in Colorado.
Not long ago, Lou sent me a powerful new piece of evidence, a presentation put together by Paul Kasriel, chief economist for Northern Trust. Titled “If Some Dare Call It Treason, Was Milton Friedman a Traitor?” (the title will become clear shortly), it has the force of revelation.
The first part of the paper is spent “dispelling the nonsense” (Kasriel’s words) that factors besides credit are the root of the problem. He persuasively mocks the idea that “uncertainty” is holding back companies from borrowing. (“Uncertainty,” Kasriel told me, “is the last refuge of economists who can’t explain what is going on.”) Ditto for onerous taxes, record budget deficits and lack of demand.
He then documents “a post-WW II record” credit contraction, before moving on to a surprising solution: more quantitative easing from the Federal Reserve, which is essentially the buying of bonds from investors by the Fed, using money it prints, as Kasriel freely admits, “out of thin air.”
That this solution is controversial is not lost on Kasriel; his title is an obvious play on Rick Perry’s comment that continued quantitative easing by the Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, would amount to borderline treason. But that’s where his reference to Friedman comes in. Kasriel is absolutely convinced that if the great conservative economist were alive today, he would be leading the charge for quantitative easing. It’s all we’ve got left.
In the 1930s, the Fed’s tight money policy compounded the lack of credit and sent the country into the Depression. Decades later, Milton Friedman was the economist who most persuasively proved that point. Bernanke, a student of the Depression, took that lesson to heart; his willingness to flood the system with liquidity during the financial crisis prevented a repeat.
It is also what led Bernanke to try the first two rounds of quantitative easing. “Banking under normal circumstances is a transmission mechanism from the Fed to the economy,” Kasriel told me. “That transmission mechanism is broken.” Quantitative easing is not nearly as efficient at expanding credit as having the banks involved, but it does work. During the decade of stagnation in Japan, Kasriel points out, Friedman urged its central bank to expand the money supply and buy bonds — exactly what Bernanke has been doing.
The main argument against the printing of money is that it raises the odds of inflation; even the esteemed Paul Volcker is worried about it, as he wrote in Monday’s Times. But Kasriel is convinced that the bigger fear right now is deflation, and that the expansion of credit by the Fed should be seen in combination with the contraction by the banks. In that larger context, the Fed’s move no longer looks inflationary. It looks instead like the only means we’ve got right now to create badly needed credit.
There is much resistance to another round of quantitative easing, not just from G.O.P. presidential hopefuls, but from many in the political establishment. Yet it’s worth noting that the reason Volcker is esteemed today is because, 30 years ago, as Fed chairman, he stuck by a monetary policy — a severe tightening, in his case — that he believed in despite fierce denunciations. His willingness to chart an unpopular course led directly to the economic revival of the 1980s.
Today, Ben Bernanke is every bit as vilified as Volcker was back then. Yet the Fed remains politically independent, and like Volcker, he has the right to chart the course he believes best, without political interference. The course he has charted is quantitative easing. Kasriel is utterly convincing that this is the right course. Bernanke should make the Fed’s independence matter.
Source: New York Times

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

The Economist | The proper diagnosis: Profligacy is not the problem

The proper diagnosis
Solving the euro-zone mess means understanding the nature of its ills. And by insisting it is just about budget deficits, too many Europeans show they don't
MISDIAGNOSIS is not, in itself, malpractice. Everyone, be they doctors or central bankers or politicians, makes mistakes. But when the misdiagnosis involves ignoring some symptoms and persisting in treatments that aren't working, it is not so easily excused. And that is what is going on with the euro, where a stress on demanding austerity has eclipsed the need to boost confidence.

Friday, September 16, 2011

Working harder and hardly hiri... (economist.com)

How Big? A Caption Contest



President Obama with Treasury Secretary Geithner, while NEC Director Gene Sperling looks on. 
Check out this caption contest from Freakonomics' Blog: