By GEORGE MELLOAN
As Congress blithely ushers its trillion dollar "stimulus" package toward law and the U.S. Treasury prepares to begin writing checks on this vast new appropriation, it might be wise to ask a simple question: Who's going to finance it?
That might seem like a no-brainer, which perhaps explains why no one has bothered to ask. Treasury securities are selling at high prices and finding buyers even though yields are low, hovering below 3% for 10-year notes. Congress is able to assure itself that it will finance the stimulus with cheap credit. But how long will credit be cheap? Will it still be when the Treasury is scrounging around in the international credit markets six months or a year from now? That seems highly unlikely.
Let's have a look at the credit market. Treasurys have been strong because the stock market collapse and the mortgage-backed securities fiasco sent the whole world running for safety. The best looking port in the storm, as usual, was U.S. Treasury paper. That is what gave the dollar and Treasury securities the lift they now enjoy.
But that surge was a one-time event and doesn't necessarily mean that a big new batch of Treasury securities will find an equally strong market. Most likely it won't as the global economy spirals downward.
For one thing, a very important cycle has been interrupted by the crash. For years, the U.S. has run large trade deficits with China and Japan and those two countries have invested their surpluses mostly in U.S. Treasury securities. Their holdings are enormous: As of Nov. 30 last year, China held $682 billion in Treasurys, a sharp rise from $459 billion a year earlier. Japan had reduced its holdings, to $577 billion from $590 billion a year earlier, but remains a huge creditor. The two account for almost 65% of total Treasury securities held by foreign owners, 19% of the total U.S. national debt, and over 30% of Treasurys held by the public.
In the lush years of the U.S. credit boom, it was rationalized that this circular arrangement was good for all concerned. Exports fueled China's rapid economic growth and created jobs for its huge work force, American workers could raise their living standards by buying cheap Chinese goods. China's dollar surplus gave the U.S. Treasury a captive pool of investment to finance congressional deficits. It was argued, persuasively, that China and Japan had no choice but to buy U.S. bonds if they wanted to keep their exports to the U.S. flowing. They also would hurt their own interests if they tried to unload Treasurys because that would send the value of their remaining holdings down.
But what if they stopped buying bonds not out of choice but because they were out of money? The virtuous circle so much praised would be broken. Something like that seems to be happening now. As the recession deepens, U.S. consumers are spending less, even on cheap Chinese goods and certainly on Japanese cars and electronic products. Japan, already a smaller market for U.S. debt last November, is now suffering what some have described as "free fall" in industrial production. Its two champions, Toyota and Sony, are faltering badly. China's growth also is slowing, and it is plagued by rising unemployment.
American officials seem not to have noticed this abrupt and dangerous change in global patterns of trade and finance. The new Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, at his Senate confirmation hearing harped on that old Treasury mantra about China "manipulating" its currency to gain trade advantage. Vice President Joe Biden followed up with a further lecture to the Chinese but said the U.S. will not move "unilaterally" to keep out Chinese exports. One would hope not "unilaterally" or any other way if the U.S. hopes to keep flogging its Treasurys to the Chinese.
The Congressional Budget Office is predicting the federal deficit will reach $1.2 trillion this fiscal year. That's more than double the $455 billion deficit posted for fiscal 2008, and some private estimates put the likely outcome even higher. That will drive up interest costs in the federal budget even if Treasury yields stay low. But if a drop in world market demand for Treasurys sends borrowing costs upward, there could be a ballooning of the interest cost line in the budget that will worsen an already frightening outlook. Credit for the rest of the economy will become more dear as well, worsening the recession. Treasury's Wednesday announcement that it will sell a record $67 billion in notes and bonds next week and $493 billion in this quarter weakened Treasury prices, revealing market sensitivity to heavy financing.
So what is the outlook? The stimulus package is rolling through Congress like an express train packed with goodies, so an enormous deficit seems to be a given. Entitlements will go up instead of being brought under better control, auguring big future deficits. Where will the Treasury find all those trillions in a depressed world economy?
There is only one answer. The Obama administration and Congress will call on Ben Bernanke at the Fed to demand that he create more dollars -- lots and lots of them. The Fed already is talking of buying longer-term Treasurys to support the market, so it will be more of the same -- much more.
And what will be the result? Well, the product of this sort of thing is called inflation. The Fed's outpouring of dollar liquidity after the September crash replaced the liquidity lost by the financial sector and has so far caused no significant uptick in consumer prices. But the worry lies in what will happen next.
Even when the economy and the securities markets are sluggish, the Fed's financing of big federal deficits can be inflationary. We learned that in the late 1970s, when the Fed's deficit financing sent the CPI up to an annual rate of almost 15%. That confounded the Keynesian theorists who believed then, as now, that federal spending "stimulus" would restore economic health.
Inflation is the product of the demand for money as well as of the supply. And if the Fed finances federal deficits in a moribund economy, it can create more money than the economy can use. The result is "stagflation," a term coined to describe the 1970s experience. As the global economy slows and Congress relies more on the Fed to finance a huge deficit, there is a very real danger of a return of stagflation. I wonder why no one in Congress or the Obama administration has thought of that as a potential consequence of their stimulus package.
Showing posts with label Policy response. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Policy response. Show all posts
Sunday, March 01, 2009
Deregulation and the Financial Panic
By Phil Gramm
The debate about the cause of the current crisis in our financial markets is important because the reforms implemented by Congress will be profoundly affected by what people believe caused the crisis.
President Bill Clinton signs the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
If the cause was an unsustainable boom in house prices and irresponsible mortgage lending that corrupted the balance sheets of the world's financial institutions, reforming the housing credit system and correcting attendant problems in the financial system are called for. But if the fundamental structure of the financial system is flawed, a more profound restructuring is required.
I believe that a strong case can be made that the financial crisis stemmed from a confluence of two factors. The first was the unintended consequences of a monetary policy, developed to combat inventory cycle recessions in the last half of the 20th century, that was not well suited to the speculative bubble recession of 2001. The second was the politicization of mortgage lending.
The 2001 recession was brought on when a speculative bubble in the equity market burst, causing investment to collapse. But unlike previous postwar recessions, consumption and the housing industry remained strong at the trough of the recession. Critics of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan say he held interest rates too low for too long, and in the process overstimulated the economy. That criticism does not capture what went wrong, however. The consequences of the Fed's monetary policy lay elsewhere.
In the inventory-cycle recessions experienced in the last half of the 20th century, involuntary build up of inventories produced retrenchment in the production chain. Workers were laid off and investment and consumption, including the housing sector, slumped.
In the 2001 recession, however, consumption and home building remained strong as investment collapsed. The Fed's sharp, prolonged reduction in interest rates stimulated a housing market that was already booming -- triggering six years of double-digit increases in housing prices during a period when the general inflation rate was low.
Buyers bought houses they couldn't afford, believing they could refinance in the future and benefit from the ongoing appreciation. Lenders assumed that even if everything else went wrong, properties could still be sold for more than they cost and the loan could be repaid. This mentality permeated the market from the originator to the holder of securitized mortgages, from the rating agency to the financial regulator.
Meanwhile, mortgage lending was becoming increasingly politicized. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements led regulators to foster looser underwriting and encouraged the making of more and more marginal loans. Looser underwriting standards spread beyond subprime to the whole housing market.
As Mr. Greenspan testified last October at a hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, "It's instructive to go back to the early stages of the subprime market, which has essentially emerged out of CRA." It was not just that CRA and federal housing policy pressured lenders to make risky loans -- but that they gave lenders the excuse and the regulatory cover.
Countrywide Financial Corp. cloaked itself in righteousness and silenced any troubled regulator by being the first mortgage lender to sign a HUD "Declaration of Fair Lending Principles and Practices." Given privileged status by Fannie Mae as a reward for "the most flexible underwriting criteria," it became the world's largest mortgage lender -- until it became the first major casualty of the financial crisis.
The 1992 Housing Bill set quotas or "targets" that Fannie and Freddie were to achieve in meeting the housing needs of low- and moderate-income Americans. In 1995 HUD raised the primary quota for low- and moderate-income housing loans from the 30% set by Congress in 1992 to 40% in 1996 and to 42% in 1997.
By the time the housing market collapsed, Fannie and Freddie faced three quotas. The first was for mortgages to individuals with below-average income, set at 56% of their overall mortgage holdings. The second targeted families with incomes at or below 60% of area median income, set at 27% of their holdings. The third targeted geographic areas deemed to be underserved, set at 35%.
The results? In 1994, 4.5% of the mortgage market was subprime and 31% of those subprime loans were securitized. By 2006, 20.1% of the entire mortgage market was subprime and 81% of those loans were securitized. The Congressional Budget Office now estimates that GSE losses will cost $240 billion in fiscal year 2009. If this crisis proves nothing else, it proves you cannot help people by lending them more money than they can pay back.
Blinded by the experience of the postwar period, where aggregate housing prices had never declined on an annual basis, and using the last 20 years as a measure of the norm, rating agencies and regulators viewed securitized mortgages, even subprime and undocumented Alt-A mortgages, as embodying little risk. It was not that regulators were not empowered; it was that they were not alarmed.
With near universal approval of regulators world-wide, these securities were injected into the arteries of the world's financial system. When the bubble burst, the financial system lost the indispensable ingredients of confidence and trust. We all know the rest of the story.
The principal alternative to the politicization of mortgage lending and bad monetary policy as causes of the financial crisis is deregulation. How deregulation caused the crisis has never been specifically explained. Nevertheless, two laws are most often blamed: the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.
GLB repealed part of the Great Depression era Glass-Steagall Act, and allowed banks, securities companies and insurance companies to affiliate under a Financial Services Holding Company. It seems clear that if GLB was the problem, the crisis would have been expected to have originated in Europe where they never had Glass-Steagall requirements to begin with. Also, the financial firms that failed in this crisis, like Lehman, were the least diversified and the ones that survived, like J.P. Morgan, were the most diversified.
Moreover, GLB didn't deregulate anything. It established the Federal Reserve as a superregulator, overseeing all Financial Services Holding Companies. All activities of financial institutions continued to be regulated on a functional basis by the regulators that had regulated those activities prior to GLB.
When no evidence was ever presented to link GLB to the financial crisis -- and when former President Bill Clinton gave a spirited defense of this law, which he signed -- proponents of the deregulation thesis turned to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), and specifically to credit default swaps.
Yet it is amazing how well the market for credit default swaps has functioned during the financial crisis. That market has never lost liquidity and the default rate has been low, given the general state of the underlying assets. In any case, the CFMA did not deregulate credit default swaps. All swaps were given legal certainty by clarifying that swaps were not futures, but remained subject to regulation just as before based on who issued the swap and the nature of the underlying contracts.
In reality the financial "deregulation" of the last two decades has been greatly exaggerated. As the housing crisis mounted, financial regulators had more power, larger budgets and more personnel than ever. And yet, with the notable exception of Mr. Greenspan's warning about the risk posed by the massive mortgage holdings of Fannie and Freddie, regulators seemed unalarmed as the crisis grew. There is absolutely no evidence that if financial regulators had had more resources or more authority that anything would have been different.
Since politicization of the mortgage market was a primary cause of this crisis, we should be especially careful to prevent the politicization of the banks that have been given taxpayer assistance. Did Citi really change its view on mortgage cram-downs or was it pressured? How much pressure was really applied to force Bank of America to go through with the Merrill acquisition?
Restrictions on executive compensation are good fun for politicians, but they are just one step removed from politicians telling banks who to lend to and for what. We have been down that road before, and we know where it leads.
Finally, it should give us pause in responding to the financial crisis of today to realize that this crisis itself was in part an unintended consequence of the monetary policy we employed to deal with the previous recession. Surely, unintended consequences are a real danger when the monetary base has been bloated by a doubling of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and the federal deficit seems destined to exceed $1.7 trillion.
The debate about the cause of the current crisis in our financial markets is important because the reforms implemented by Congress will be profoundly affected by what people believe caused the crisis.
President Bill Clinton signs the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
If the cause was an unsustainable boom in house prices and irresponsible mortgage lending that corrupted the balance sheets of the world's financial institutions, reforming the housing credit system and correcting attendant problems in the financial system are called for. But if the fundamental structure of the financial system is flawed, a more profound restructuring is required.
I believe that a strong case can be made that the financial crisis stemmed from a confluence of two factors. The first was the unintended consequences of a monetary policy, developed to combat inventory cycle recessions in the last half of the 20th century, that was not well suited to the speculative bubble recession of 2001. The second was the politicization of mortgage lending.
The 2001 recession was brought on when a speculative bubble in the equity market burst, causing investment to collapse. But unlike previous postwar recessions, consumption and the housing industry remained strong at the trough of the recession. Critics of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan say he held interest rates too low for too long, and in the process overstimulated the economy. That criticism does not capture what went wrong, however. The consequences of the Fed's monetary policy lay elsewhere.
In the inventory-cycle recessions experienced in the last half of the 20th century, involuntary build up of inventories produced retrenchment in the production chain. Workers were laid off and investment and consumption, including the housing sector, slumped.
In the 2001 recession, however, consumption and home building remained strong as investment collapsed. The Fed's sharp, prolonged reduction in interest rates stimulated a housing market that was already booming -- triggering six years of double-digit increases in housing prices during a period when the general inflation rate was low.
Buyers bought houses they couldn't afford, believing they could refinance in the future and benefit from the ongoing appreciation. Lenders assumed that even if everything else went wrong, properties could still be sold for more than they cost and the loan could be repaid. This mentality permeated the market from the originator to the holder of securitized mortgages, from the rating agency to the financial regulator.
Meanwhile, mortgage lending was becoming increasingly politicized. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements led regulators to foster looser underwriting and encouraged the making of more and more marginal loans. Looser underwriting standards spread beyond subprime to the whole housing market.
As Mr. Greenspan testified last October at a hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, "It's instructive to go back to the early stages of the subprime market, which has essentially emerged out of CRA." It was not just that CRA and federal housing policy pressured lenders to make risky loans -- but that they gave lenders the excuse and the regulatory cover.
Countrywide Financial Corp. cloaked itself in righteousness and silenced any troubled regulator by being the first mortgage lender to sign a HUD "Declaration of Fair Lending Principles and Practices." Given privileged status by Fannie Mae as a reward for "the most flexible underwriting criteria," it became the world's largest mortgage lender -- until it became the first major casualty of the financial crisis.
The 1992 Housing Bill set quotas or "targets" that Fannie and Freddie were to achieve in meeting the housing needs of low- and moderate-income Americans. In 1995 HUD raised the primary quota for low- and moderate-income housing loans from the 30% set by Congress in 1992 to 40% in 1996 and to 42% in 1997.
By the time the housing market collapsed, Fannie and Freddie faced three quotas. The first was for mortgages to individuals with below-average income, set at 56% of their overall mortgage holdings. The second targeted families with incomes at or below 60% of area median income, set at 27% of their holdings. The third targeted geographic areas deemed to be underserved, set at 35%.
The results? In 1994, 4.5% of the mortgage market was subprime and 31% of those subprime loans were securitized. By 2006, 20.1% of the entire mortgage market was subprime and 81% of those loans were securitized. The Congressional Budget Office now estimates that GSE losses will cost $240 billion in fiscal year 2009. If this crisis proves nothing else, it proves you cannot help people by lending them more money than they can pay back.
Blinded by the experience of the postwar period, where aggregate housing prices had never declined on an annual basis, and using the last 20 years as a measure of the norm, rating agencies and regulators viewed securitized mortgages, even subprime and undocumented Alt-A mortgages, as embodying little risk. It was not that regulators were not empowered; it was that they were not alarmed.
With near universal approval of regulators world-wide, these securities were injected into the arteries of the world's financial system. When the bubble burst, the financial system lost the indispensable ingredients of confidence and trust. We all know the rest of the story.
The principal alternative to the politicization of mortgage lending and bad monetary policy as causes of the financial crisis is deregulation. How deregulation caused the crisis has never been specifically explained. Nevertheless, two laws are most often blamed: the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.
GLB repealed part of the Great Depression era Glass-Steagall Act, and allowed banks, securities companies and insurance companies to affiliate under a Financial Services Holding Company. It seems clear that if GLB was the problem, the crisis would have been expected to have originated in Europe where they never had Glass-Steagall requirements to begin with. Also, the financial firms that failed in this crisis, like Lehman, were the least diversified and the ones that survived, like J.P. Morgan, were the most diversified.
Moreover, GLB didn't deregulate anything. It established the Federal Reserve as a superregulator, overseeing all Financial Services Holding Companies. All activities of financial institutions continued to be regulated on a functional basis by the regulators that had regulated those activities prior to GLB.
When no evidence was ever presented to link GLB to the financial crisis -- and when former President Bill Clinton gave a spirited defense of this law, which he signed -- proponents of the deregulation thesis turned to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), and specifically to credit default swaps.
Yet it is amazing how well the market for credit default swaps has functioned during the financial crisis. That market has never lost liquidity and the default rate has been low, given the general state of the underlying assets. In any case, the CFMA did not deregulate credit default swaps. All swaps were given legal certainty by clarifying that swaps were not futures, but remained subject to regulation just as before based on who issued the swap and the nature of the underlying contracts.
In reality the financial "deregulation" of the last two decades has been greatly exaggerated. As the housing crisis mounted, financial regulators had more power, larger budgets and more personnel than ever. And yet, with the notable exception of Mr. Greenspan's warning about the risk posed by the massive mortgage holdings of Fannie and Freddie, regulators seemed unalarmed as the crisis grew. There is absolutely no evidence that if financial regulators had had more resources or more authority that anything would have been different.
Since politicization of the mortgage market was a primary cause of this crisis, we should be especially careful to prevent the politicization of the banks that have been given taxpayer assistance. Did Citi really change its view on mortgage cram-downs or was it pressured? How much pressure was really applied to force Bank of America to go through with the Merrill acquisition?
Restrictions on executive compensation are good fun for politicians, but they are just one step removed from politicians telling banks who to lend to and for what. We have been down that road before, and we know where it leads.
Finally, it should give us pause in responding to the financial crisis of today to realize that this crisis itself was in part an unintended consequence of the monetary policy we employed to deal with the previous recession. Surely, unintended consequences are a real danger when the monetary base has been bloated by a doubling of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and the federal deficit seems destined to exceed $1.7 trillion.
Bank Bailout Plan Revamped
Source: WSJ
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to announce that the government will become a partner with the private sector to purchase banks' troubled assets, according to people familiar with the matter.
The plan for a so-called aggregator bank, a variation on a theme that Obama administration officials have wrestled with for weeks, is among four main components of Mr. Geithner's bailout revamp, which he is expected to announce Tuesday.
The effort to restore confidence to the financial system comprises a broad range of tools and government agencies. It includes fresh cash injections into banks; new programs to help possibly 2.5 million struggling homeowners; a significant expansion of a Federal Reserve program designed to jump-start consumer lending; and, lastly, the mechanism to allow banks to get rid of bad assets.
The administration's plans have evolved over the past several weeks as it has considered and discarded a host of ideas, with financial markets anxiously awaiting details. Mr. Geithner had planned an announcement Monday but delayed it a day to allow the focus to remain on the stimulus bill in Congress.
The aggregator bank, which some refer to as a "bad bank," would be designed to solve a fundamental challenge: How can banks purge themselves of their bad bets without worsening their weakened condition?
The entity would be seeded with funds from the $700 billion financial-sector bailout fund, but the idea is that most financing would come from the private sector. Some critical elements remained unclear, including exactly how the government would entice investors to participate in the private bank, given that they can already buy soured assets on the open market if they want to. The government will likely offer some type of incentive, such as limiting the risk associated with buying the assets.
The administration hasn't settled on exactly how it will work and intends to hash out the structure with the private sector over the next few weeks, the people familiar with the matter said. Investors would likely buy a stake in the entity, which would then buy mortgage-backed securities and other troubled assets.
The government would also be an investor, but the terms aren't yet decided. The entity might also raise funds by selling government-backed debt or through financing from the Fed, the people familiar with the matter said.
The Obama administration views the private bank as a way to get around the thorny issue of having to determine a price for soured assets such as certain mortgage-backed securities, many of which are illiquid and hard to value. The government has long worried that if it bought toxic assets and paid too much for them, banks would benefit at the expense of taxpayers -- while if the price was too low, it would force banks to take further write-downs and exacerbate their woes.
The Treasury's working theory for the government/private-sector partnership is that investors wouldn't overpay, because if they did, they'd stand to lose money; but they also wouldn't underpay, since the selling banks wouldn't be willing to part with their assets too cheaply.
Bankers and investors cautiously welcomed the idea, saying it could help avoid more large-scale federal intrusions into the financial sector while tackling the bad-asset problem. Brian Sterling, co-head of investment banking for advisory firm Sandler O'Neill & Partners, called the idea an "interesting tool" worth exploring.
"We think that anything that helps facilitate taking nonperforming assets off bank balance sheets or putting a ringfence around them is a good thing," Mr. Sterling said. Some investors expressed concern about joining with the government in such an arrangement if the rules of engagement weren't guaranteed to remain consistent.
Executives at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. have been cool to the idea of selling assets into a "bad bank" structure. They believe it may be wiser to hold on to sour assets that have already been written down, in the hope the bank can recoup losses when markets revive.
Many of the administration's ideas appear to build on policies begun under former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, whose handling of the bailout helped tar its reputation among lawmakers and the public. Mr. Paulson's plan initially envisioned buying toxic assets but shifted to having the government inject cash into banks in return for preferred stock. Many of the housing ideas under consideration also stem from work done in the Bush administration, illustrating the constrained range of options.
Mr. Geithner is expected to sell the program as a break with the past, pitching it as a comprehensive framework to address the root causes of the financial crisis: defaulting loans and soured assets that are shaking confidence in banks.
Other likely elements of the plan, subject to last-minute changes, include:
An expansion of the Fed's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to include assets beyond the student-loan, auto-loan and credit-card debt it was set up to absorb. Under the revamp, the so-called TALF is likely to buy securities backed by commercial real estate and possibly other assets as well. The program was set up during the Bush administration to spur the consumer-loan market by providing financing for investors to buy securities backed by such loans.
A second round of cash injections in financial firms but with tougher terms, such as a requirement to modify troubled mortgages and better track the federal funds. The government is looking to get money into banks by buying preferred shares that convert into common shares in seven years; the idea is to avoid diluting current shareholders' stakes while helping banks better withstand losses. The Treasury may also allow banks that have already received capital to convert the Treasury's preferred shares to common stock over time.
Dow Jones Newswires columnist Simon Constable finds out from MarketBeat blogger David Gaffen what U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to unveil in his new plans to fix the financial crisis.
Giving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. power to help dismantle troubled financial firms beyond the depository institutions over which it now has authority. This could require legislation.
Mr. Geithner, his predecessor Mr. Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke have said there needs to be a government entity empowered to wind down failed financial institutions that aren't banks. Regulators have said one problem the government faced when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and American International Group Inc. ran into trouble was that no federal body had authority to step in and steer the firms toward an orderly demise.
Having the FDIC guarantee a wider range of debt that banks issue to fund loans is also a likely element of the plan, said people familiar with the matter. The guarantees could help free up credit to both companies and consumers. Currently, the FDIC temporarily backs certain debt with a three-year maturity. Government officials could increase this to maturities up to 10 years.
More help for homeowners, at a cost of between $50 billion and $100 billion. The administration is expected to create national standards for loan modifications that would be adopted by mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The plan could include a mechanism to determine the value of homes facing foreclosure, which could speed negotiations with borrowers. The difficulty of valuing such homes is one reason many loan-modification efforts have stalled.
A related move would see the government using taxpayer dollars to give mortgage companies an incentive to modify loans. One idea would help reduce interest rates for consumers by having the government match mortgage companies' interest-rate reductions to some degree. For instance, if a mortgage company agreed to shave one point off the rate on a loan, the government might match that so the rate would be reduced by two points. Mr. Geithner is also expected to express support for legislation that would allow judges to modify the terms of mortgages in bankruptcy court.
A public-relations makeover. To improve the bailout's poor image, which owes partly to the shifting nature of the government's remedies, the administration is considering renaming the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program and making it independent of the Treasury. The U.S. is going to announce new terms and conditions for companies that receive or have already taken government aid -- in addition to the new executive-compensation limits announced this week -- including a demand that they report how the money is being spent.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to announce that the government will become a partner with the private sector to purchase banks' troubled assets, according to people familiar with the matter.
The plan for a so-called aggregator bank, a variation on a theme that Obama administration officials have wrestled with for weeks, is among four main components of Mr. Geithner's bailout revamp, which he is expected to announce Tuesday.
The effort to restore confidence to the financial system comprises a broad range of tools and government agencies. It includes fresh cash injections into banks; new programs to help possibly 2.5 million struggling homeowners; a significant expansion of a Federal Reserve program designed to jump-start consumer lending; and, lastly, the mechanism to allow banks to get rid of bad assets.
The administration's plans have evolved over the past several weeks as it has considered and discarded a host of ideas, with financial markets anxiously awaiting details. Mr. Geithner had planned an announcement Monday but delayed it a day to allow the focus to remain on the stimulus bill in Congress.
The aggregator bank, which some refer to as a "bad bank," would be designed to solve a fundamental challenge: How can banks purge themselves of their bad bets without worsening their weakened condition?
The entity would be seeded with funds from the $700 billion financial-sector bailout fund, but the idea is that most financing would come from the private sector. Some critical elements remained unclear, including exactly how the government would entice investors to participate in the private bank, given that they can already buy soured assets on the open market if they want to. The government will likely offer some type of incentive, such as limiting the risk associated with buying the assets.
The administration hasn't settled on exactly how it will work and intends to hash out the structure with the private sector over the next few weeks, the people familiar with the matter said. Investors would likely buy a stake in the entity, which would then buy mortgage-backed securities and other troubled assets.
The government would also be an investor, but the terms aren't yet decided. The entity might also raise funds by selling government-backed debt or through financing from the Fed, the people familiar with the matter said.
The Obama administration views the private bank as a way to get around the thorny issue of having to determine a price for soured assets such as certain mortgage-backed securities, many of which are illiquid and hard to value. The government has long worried that if it bought toxic assets and paid too much for them, banks would benefit at the expense of taxpayers -- while if the price was too low, it would force banks to take further write-downs and exacerbate their woes.
The Treasury's working theory for the government/private-sector partnership is that investors wouldn't overpay, because if they did, they'd stand to lose money; but they also wouldn't underpay, since the selling banks wouldn't be willing to part with their assets too cheaply.
Bankers and investors cautiously welcomed the idea, saying it could help avoid more large-scale federal intrusions into the financial sector while tackling the bad-asset problem. Brian Sterling, co-head of investment banking for advisory firm Sandler O'Neill & Partners, called the idea an "interesting tool" worth exploring.
"We think that anything that helps facilitate taking nonperforming assets off bank balance sheets or putting a ringfence around them is a good thing," Mr. Sterling said. Some investors expressed concern about joining with the government in such an arrangement if the rules of engagement weren't guaranteed to remain consistent.
Executives at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. have been cool to the idea of selling assets into a "bad bank" structure. They believe it may be wiser to hold on to sour assets that have already been written down, in the hope the bank can recoup losses when markets revive.
Many of the administration's ideas appear to build on policies begun under former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, whose handling of the bailout helped tar its reputation among lawmakers and the public. Mr. Paulson's plan initially envisioned buying toxic assets but shifted to having the government inject cash into banks in return for preferred stock. Many of the housing ideas under consideration also stem from work done in the Bush administration, illustrating the constrained range of options.
Mr. Geithner is expected to sell the program as a break with the past, pitching it as a comprehensive framework to address the root causes of the financial crisis: defaulting loans and soured assets that are shaking confidence in banks.
Other likely elements of the plan, subject to last-minute changes, include:
An expansion of the Fed's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to include assets beyond the student-loan, auto-loan and credit-card debt it was set up to absorb. Under the revamp, the so-called TALF is likely to buy securities backed by commercial real estate and possibly other assets as well. The program was set up during the Bush administration to spur the consumer-loan market by providing financing for investors to buy securities backed by such loans.
A second round of cash injections in financial firms but with tougher terms, such as a requirement to modify troubled mortgages and better track the federal funds. The government is looking to get money into banks by buying preferred shares that convert into common shares in seven years; the idea is to avoid diluting current shareholders' stakes while helping banks better withstand losses. The Treasury may also allow banks that have already received capital to convert the Treasury's preferred shares to common stock over time.
Dow Jones Newswires columnist Simon Constable finds out from MarketBeat blogger David Gaffen what U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to unveil in his new plans to fix the financial crisis.
Giving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. power to help dismantle troubled financial firms beyond the depository institutions over which it now has authority. This could require legislation.
Mr. Geithner, his predecessor Mr. Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke have said there needs to be a government entity empowered to wind down failed financial institutions that aren't banks. Regulators have said one problem the government faced when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and American International Group Inc. ran into trouble was that no federal body had authority to step in and steer the firms toward an orderly demise.
Having the FDIC guarantee a wider range of debt that banks issue to fund loans is also a likely element of the plan, said people familiar with the matter. The guarantees could help free up credit to both companies and consumers. Currently, the FDIC temporarily backs certain debt with a three-year maturity. Government officials could increase this to maturities up to 10 years.
More help for homeowners, at a cost of between $50 billion and $100 billion. The administration is expected to create national standards for loan modifications that would be adopted by mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The plan could include a mechanism to determine the value of homes facing foreclosure, which could speed negotiations with borrowers. The difficulty of valuing such homes is one reason many loan-modification efforts have stalled.
A related move would see the government using taxpayer dollars to give mortgage companies an incentive to modify loans. One idea would help reduce interest rates for consumers by having the government match mortgage companies' interest-rate reductions to some degree. For instance, if a mortgage company agreed to shave one point off the rate on a loan, the government might match that so the rate would be reduced by two points. Mr. Geithner is also expected to express support for legislation that would allow judges to modify the terms of mortgages in bankruptcy court.
A public-relations makeover. To improve the bailout's poor image, which owes partly to the shifting nature of the government's remedies, the administration is considering renaming the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program and making it independent of the Treasury. The U.S. is going to announce new terms and conditions for companies that receive or have already taken government aid -- in addition to the new executive-compensation limits announced this week -- including a demand that they report how the money is being spent.
Monday, November 05, 2007
Fed Plans Transparency Steps
Greg Ip, WSJ:Federal Reserve officials are nearing consensus on several steps to make their deliberations more transparent to the public, but are likely to defer one of Chairman Ben Bernanke's longstanding goals: an explicit inflation target.
The centerpiece of their new communications steps would be the release of economic forecasts of policy makers four times a year, instead of the current two times, with additional detail and background... Moreover, the horizon for those forecasts would be extended to three years from two.
The ... Fed had hoped to finalize them by this month. But the fallout of the market turmoil that erupted in August has complicated the agenda of next week's meeting of the policy-making Federal Open Market Committee and it may defer decisions on its communications policy to a later meeting. ...
While the idea of setting an inflation target hasn't been shelved, officials say it needs more discussion. ... For Mr. Bernanke, deferral of an inflation target represents a setback, but he can chalk up a tactical victory for forging a consensus on other steps. ...
At his nomination hearing in 2005, Mr. Bernanke restated his preference for a target while promising "extensive discussion and consultation" and "no precipitate steps." ...
The FOMC as a whole is still not ready to take the step. One concern is that Congress, having taken a more populist turn since Democrats took power in 2006, could perceive a target as subordinating the Fed's responsibility for employment, despite Mr. Bernanke's insistence to the contrary. Another is that officials don't think the current system is broken.
At present, the FOMC meets eight times a year, and at two of its meetings, members submit forecasts for the current and next year on growth, inflation and unemployment that are included in a report to Congress. The "central tendency" of those forecasts -- a range that excludes the extreme projections -- garners the most attention. ...
At present, the post-meeting FOMC statement and the minutes aren't expected to be altered significantly.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
The Fed's Confession
When it comes to admitting error, central bankers tend to emulate Benjamin Disraeli, who famously said "never complain, never explain." So it was nothing short of astonishing last week for Richard Fisher, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, to confess in public that the Fed had blundered by keeping monetary policy too easy for too long in 2003 and 2004.
Speaking to bankers in New York, Mr. Fisher issued a mea maxima culpa that deserves wide attention: "In retrospect, the real fed funds rate turned out to be lower than what was deemed appropriate at the time and was held lower longer than it should have been." As the nearby chart shows, a Fed worried about possible "deflation" moved the overnight interest rate it charges banks in June 2003 to an extraordinarily low 1% and kept it there for another year.
Mr. Fisher blamed this mistake on "poor data" that underestimated inflation, leading "to a policy action that amplified speculative activity in the housing and other markets. Today, as anybody not from the former planet of Pluto knows, the housing market is undergoing a substantial correction and inflicting real costs to millions of homeowners across the country." In other words, the Fed itself is responsible for the current housing bust because its over-easy policy created a real estate frenzy that was bound to end once the Fed tried to regain control over inflation expectations.
From: Wall Street Journal
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)